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Abstract It is commonly observed that we live in an increasingly polarised world. 
Strikingly, we are polarised not only about political issues, but also about scientific 
issues that have political implications, such as climate change. This raises two 
questions. First, why are we so polarised over these issues? Second, does this mean 
our views about these issues are all equally ir/rational? In this chapter I explore 
both questions. Specifically, I draw on the literature on ideologically motivated 
reasoning to develop an answer to the first question. Put briefly, we exhibit 
“directional biases” in our information processing: we try to assimilate new 
information into our existing webs of beliefs. This means that those who are 
predisposed to accept the case for climate change end up accepting it, whereas 
those who are predisposed to reject it end up rejecting it. Based on this answer, I 
then address the second question. I look at some reasons for thinking that, because 
we all exhibit such biases in our thinking, we are all equally rational (or, as the case 
may be, irrational). I also suggest some ways you might try reject these reasons. 
1.1. Introductory Remarks 
My topic is public irrationality about political issues and certain scientific issues 
that have become politically contentious, like climate change (I call these “hot” 
scientific issues). More specifically, my question is: are there partisan asymmetries 
in the rationality (or lack thereof) of views about these sorts of issues? In the 
literature on this question it is common to frame things in terms of the “political 
divide” between liberals and conservatives. So the question becomes: are 
conservatives more irrational than liberals, or vice versa?i If there are such 
asymmetries, then the epistemic asymmetry thesis is true: 
The epistemic asymmetry thesis: One side of the “political divide” generally has 
rational views about political and “hot” scientific issues, whereas the other side 
generally has irrational views about such issues. 
In the empirical literature some claim that the epistemic asymmetry thesis—or 
something like it—is true (Baron and Jost, 2019; Hodson and Busseri, 2012; 
Iyengar et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003; Kanazawa, 2010; Nisbet et al., 2013). But 
others reject it (Ditto et al., 2019; Kahan et al., 2011a; Lewandowsky and Oberauer, 
2016; Stanovich, this volume). In this chapter I give an overview of the empirical 
and philosophical literature pertaining to the epistemic asymmetry thesis. I focus 
on arguments against the epistemic asymmetry thesis because my impression is that 
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the “standard” view in the empirical literature is that the epistemic asymmetry 
thesis is false (see Ditto et al. 2019). It therefore makes sense to consider whether 
the case against it stands up. I don’t take a stance on whether the epistemic 
asymmetry thesis is true but I point to some places where philosophy—and in 
particular epistemology—can offer resources for defending the epistemic 
asymmetry thesis. Thus, this chapter should have something to offer both to those 
who reject the epistemic asymmetry thesis and to those who accept it. 
Here is the plan. First, I clarify the epistemic asymmetry thesis (§2). Second, I run 
through two arguments against it and identify lacunae in both arguments (§§3-4). I 
finish by considering some recent work by Dan Kahan which suggests that, while 
there may not be partisan asymmetries in rationality, there are some interesting 
asymmetries in rationality between those who possess and those who lack certain 
character traits (§5). 
1.2. Epistemic and Cognitive Asymmetries  
You might think the epistemic asymmetry thesis is clearly true because 
conservatives are more “anti-science” than liberals. Just consider climate change 
denial, which is largely the preserve of conservatives (Hardisty et al., 2010; Kahan 
et al., 2011a; Tranter and Booth, 2015). Now, one way of responding to this is 
would be by simply denying that conservatives are more anti-science than liberals 
(this is the route taken by Keith Stanovich in his chapter in this handbook). While 
this possibility cannot be dismissed, I want to set it to one side. This is because 
some critics of the epistemic asymmetry thesis think the thesis is false even if 
conservatives are more anti-science than liberals. As two critics put it: 
[T]he rejection of specific scientific evidence across a range of issues, as well as 
generalized distrust in science, appears to be concentrated primarily among the 
political right. It does not follow, however, that there are any fundamental 
differences in the cognition between people of differing political attitudes and 
values. Quite to the contrary, the cognitive shortcuts that drive the rejection of 
scientific evidence appear to be politically symmetrical (Lewandowsky and 
Oberauer, 2016, p. 218). 
While “science denialism” may be more prevalent among conservatives than 
liberals, this is not due to “fundamental differences in cognition”. Both 
conservatives and liberals utilise the same heuristics in their thinking and are 
subject to the same sorts of biases. But these heuristics and biases lead them in 
different directions. It leads conservatives to (often) reject science, whereas it leads 
liberals to (generally) accept science. As Lewandowsky and Oberauer put it: 
[T]he basic cognitive processes implicated in the rejection of science—namely, 
cognitive shortcuts, differential risk perception, and conspiracist cognition—
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appear to be universal and engaged on both sides of the political aisle (2016, p. 
220). 
Thus, while there may be a kind of epistemic asymmetry between liberals and 
conservatives when it comes to their views about issues like climate change—one 
side has largely true beliefs, whereas the other has largely false beliefs—this is not 
an asymmetry in rationality. So the epistemic asymmetry thesis is false. Further, it is 
false because there is a sort of cognitive symmetry between liberals and conservatives. 
Members of both groups form their views about these issues in the same sorts of 
ways. 
What do I mean when I say there is a cognitive symmetry? Here are two—
simplistic but suggestive—ways of understanding it. First, as inquirers, we need to 
make decisions about how to gather the information and evidence we need to 
make judgements and form beliefs. This includes decisions about who to ask for 
information, and who to trust. These are decisions about how to structure our 
inquiries. We can say that there is a cognitive symmetry between two inquirers (or 
groups of inquirers) with respect to some issue when their inquiries into that issue 
are structured in the same sort of way. 
Second, we are all biased in various ways, if not to the same extent (e.g. some of us 
are more likely to “pause” and engage in reflective System 2 reasoning than 
others). We can say that there is a cognitive symmetry between two inquiries with 
respect to some issue when they exhibit the same sort of biases in their thinking 
about that issue. 
Putting this together, one reason why the epistemic asymmetry thesis might not be 
true, even though one side of the partisan divide seems to have more false beliefs 
about science than the other, is that there are underlying cognitive symmetries 
between liberals and conservatives. While one side happens to get things right 
more often than the other, both sides form beliefs about these issues in the same 
sort of way. In the next two sections I will look at attempts to cash this line of 
thought out. 
1.3. Kahan Ideologically Motivated Reasoning 
Empirical work on motivated reasoning suggests our judgments are influenced by 
our wants, desires and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; 
Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). I am interested in the impact 
of our political ideologies on our assessment of arguments pertaining to political 
and “hot” scientific issues. Call this ideologically motivated reasoning (IMR for 
short). In particular, I focus on Dan Kahan’s work on IMR, because he is a vocal 




Here is Kahan explaining the basic idea: 
Even among modestly partisan individuals, shared ideological or cultural 
commitments are likely to be intertwined with membership in communities of 
one sort or another that furnish those individuals with important forms of 
support … If a proposition about some policy-relevant fact comes to be 
commonly associated with membership in such a group, the prospect that one 
might form a contrary position can threaten one’s standing within it. Thus, as a 
form of “identity self-defense,” individuals are unconsciously motivated to 
resist empirical assertions … if those assertions run contrary to the dominant 
belief within their groups (Kahan, 2013, p. 408). 
Kahan has found that ideologies influence our information-processing when it 
comes to several political and scientific issues, including climate change, nuclear 
power, concealed carry laws, nanotechnology and perceptions of protestors 
(Kahan et al., 2012, 2011a, 2009). When it comes to these sorts of issues, we all 
tend to make judgements and form beliefs that cohere with our ideologies. The 
way in which we process information pertaining to political and “hot” scientific 
issues exhibits a “directional bias”: we happily take on board information that 
coheres with our existing beliefs and values, but look for ways to reject 
information that conflicts with them. 
There are two crucial points to note about Kahan’s work on IMR. The first is that 
he thinks both liberals and conservatives engage in it. So, for instance, conservatives 
tend to under-estimate the risks posed by global warming, whereas liberals tend to 
over-estimate the risks posed by nuclear power (Kahan et al., 2011a). Thus, both 
liberals and conservatives exhibit directional biases in their information-processing. 
Second, one might expect the influence of IMR to decrease as scientific 
comprehension, scientific literacy and numeracy increase. Kahan finds that, in fact, 
it is more like the reverse: the influence of IMR increases as scientific 
comprehension, scientific literacy and numeracy increase. Importantly, this goes 
for both liberals and conservatives (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017b, 2011a).iii 
Thus, conservatives who score highly on scientific comprehension, scientific 
literacy and numeracy are more skeptical about global warming than conservatives 
who score lower on these things.  
Putting this together, Kahan doesn’t deny there are important differences between 
liberal and conservative attitudes towards science. He may even agree that 
conservatives generally have more false beliefs about “hot” scientific issues than 
liberals and so there is a kind of partisan epistemic asymmetry. But the crucial 
point is that this is not an asymmetry in rationality because it is not due to 
cognitive asymmetries between liberals and conservatives. Rather, there is an 
underlying symmetry between the ways in which liberals and conservatives make 
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judgements and form beliefs about “hot” scientific issues: both engage extensively 
in IMR. So the epistemic asymmetry thesis is false. 
I want to finish this section by highlighting a lacuna in Kahan’s argument against 
the epistemic asymmetry thesis. One might argue that, while both liberals and 
conservatives engage in IMR, conservatives engage in it more than liberals, or that it 
has more of an impact on the thinking of conservatives than of liberals. This may 
be borne out in the fact that Kahan’s studies generally find that conservative 
skepticism about issues like climate change is more pronounced than liberal 
skepticism about issues like the safety of nuclear power (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
and Braman 2011). So while there may be no cognitive asymmetry in kind between 
liberals and conservatives, there is an asymmetry in degree.  
Crucially, this cognitive asymmetry in degree may support a range of epistemic 
asymmetries between the attitudes of liberals and conservatives about “hot” 
scientific issues. For instance, it may be that liberal acceptance of the scientific 
consensus on climate change is more rational than conservative rejection of it, 
because liberal acceptance is less influenced by IMR than conservative rejection. 
Now, to say that some belief A is more rational than some belief B is not to say 
that A is rational whereas B is irrational. Rationality comes in degrees, and A can 
be more rational than B while still being irrational. But one could supplement what 
I have said here with an argument that the influence of IMR on liberal political 
cognition does not impugn the rationality of beliefs liberals form about issues like 
climate change, whereas conservative political cognition is influenced by IMR to 
such a degree that conservative views about issues like climate change are 
irrational.iv  
1.4. Levy and Rini on Partisan Epistemology 
In this section I look at two recent papers in political epistemology, Neil Levy’s 
“Due Deference to Denialism” (Levy, 2019) and Regina Rini’s “Fake News and 
Partisan Epistemology” (Rini, 2017). I focus on these papers because they are 
prime examples of empirically informed political epistemology and because I think 
they usefully complement each other. We can start with Levy, who tells us: 
While we are apt to accept testimony—to defer to others—we reject testimony 
from sources that signal unreliability by evincing cues of incompetence or lack 
of benevolence. When science becomes politicized, expression of the scientific 
consensus may itself come to serve as a signal of lack of benevolence to those 
on one side of the issue, leading to rejection of the testimony. On all sides, 
filtering mechanisms may be working as designed, but for reasons beyond the 
purview of the individuals involved, warrant may accrue to one side alone 
(2019, p. 314). 
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We use two criteria to assess the reliability of testimony: the competence of the 
testifier, and the extent to which they are benevolent towards us. Levy thinks we 
often use political affiliation as a proxy for benevolence. If someone agrees with us 
on fundamental political issues, we will (all else being equal) regard them as 
benevolent; if they disagree with us on these issues, we (all else being equal) won’t. 
Applying these criteria leads individuals with divergent political positions to form 
divergent views on “hot” scientific issues. Given the divergent attitudes of liberals 
and conservatives towards scientific expertise, we find that: 
Liberals are epistemically luckier: they are disposed to defer to the most 
competent individuals and institutions, because these individuals and 
institutions pass tests for benevolence as well as for competence. Liberals defer 
to sufficiently large groups of sufficiently expert deliberators to ensure that their 
beliefs have a high degree of warrant; conservatives defer to a much smaller 
group of genuine experts and their chains of deference trace back as much or 
more to non-experts. These facts (which are outside the purview of the 
individuals at the end of each chain) entail that one set of beliefs is very much 
better warranted than the other. Biased assimilation may thus be individually 
rational, whether it leads toward better or worse warranted beliefs (pp. 322-3). 
Levy says that both liberals and conservatives are “individually rational”. But his 
argument is based on the descriptive claim that we have a general tendency to trust 
people we share a political outlook with (cf. Marks et al., n.d.). The fact that we 
have a tendency does not show that it is rational. So why think that the tendency 
Levy highlights is rational? 
This is where Rini comes in. In her paper she defends this claim: 
It is sometimes reasonable to assign more credibility to testifier A than testifier 
B just because you agree with A (but do not agree with B) on a range of central 
political issues (Rini, 2017, p. 50). 
If this claim is true, then the partisan patterns of deference highlighted by Levy are 
rational. Of course, it is clearly not reasonable for a liberal to listen to a liberal 
journalist and ignore a conservative physicist when it comes to testimony about 
physics. Rini’s view is rather that it is reasonable when the testimony either 
concerns a straightforwardly normative issue (such as the morality of abortion), or 
an issue with a normative dimension. It is plausible that many “hot” scientific 
issues have a normative dimension, though what that dimension is will depend on 
the issue at hand. Rini’s example is crime rates. Is crime rising or falling? To 
answer this question, we need to first define “crime”, and then figure out how to 
measure how much of it there is. It is hard to see how this could be done without 
taking any stance on some normative issues. Rini’s thought is that it may be 
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reasonable for me to regard A’s testimony about crime rates as more credible than 
B’s testimony because I agree with A on these normative issues. 
Rini doesn’t discuss issues like climate change. But one can argue that, while the 
question whether human activity is causing the Earth’s climate to change is a 
scientific question, the more general issue has a clear normative dimension. We 
need to decide inter alia the extent to which we are morally responsible for 
protecting the Earth’s climate, whether the evidence we have is sufficient to 
warrant action (and, if it is, which courses of action are appropriate), on whom the 
greatest burdens should be placed (all countries? all developed countries?), and 
whether the potential benefits outweigh the risks of economic catastrophe. 
However clear you may think the answers are to these questions, they are clearly 
normative, not purely scientific.v  
If we combine Rini’s claim with Levy’s, we get this argument: 
1. We—both liberals and conservatives—tend to defer to our fellow partisans 
about political and “hot” scientific issues [from Levy]. 
2. It is (often) rational to defer to fellow partisans about such issues [from 
Rini]. 
3. Therefore, while we generally end up with divergent views about such 
issues, these divergent views are (often) rational. 
Take Catriona, who thinks crime rates are rising, and Laurie, who thinks they are 
falling. They have formed these beliefs because they have listened to what like-
minded partisans say about the issue. But Catriona leans conservative, whereas 
Laurie leans liberal. Catriona agrees with the conservative narrative on law and 
order; Laurie agrees with the liberal narrative. If the above argument is correct, it 
may well be that they are both reasonable in doing so. Now, it must be the case 
that one of them is wrong: crime can’t both be rising and falling. But it is less clear 
there is any asymmetry in rationality here. Both Laurie and Catriona have formed 
their beliefs in much the same way (by listening to like-minded partisans). This 
point will generalise beyond Catriona and Laurie. Many disagreements about 
political issues, or scientific issues with a political resonance, will have the form of 
Catriona and Laurie’s.  
How does this fare as an argument against the epistemic asymmetry thesis? Even if 
we grant that there is a sense of “rational” in which liberals and conservatives are 
equally rational (for critical discussion see Worsnip, 2018), there is a potential 
lacuna here, which Levy notes. He allows that there may be a sort of epistemic 
asymmetry between liberals and conservatives—an asymmetry in what he calls 
“warrant”. We can explore this point further by considering the literature on 
epistemic rationality. I am going to suggest that whether the argument goes 
through might depend on what we mean by “rational”. 
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It is standard to distinguish between internalist and externalist approaches to 
epistemic rationality (Pappas, 2017). Put roughly, on an internalist approach, 
whether one’s beliefs are rational depends only on facts that are cognitively 
accessible to one whereas, on an externalist approach, whether they are rational 
depends on a combination of cognitively accessible and cognitively inaccessible 
facts. Put crudely, for the internalist, it matters whether you are in a position to 
recognise when you have got it wrong, whereas, for the externalist, what matters is 
whether you generally get things right or wrong. 
My suggestion is that the tendencies adverted to by Rini and Levy are rational in 
the internalist sense of epistemic rationality. As Levy puts it, facts “outwith the 
purview of the individual” mean that, while liberal views about “hot” scientific 
issues are (largely) correct, conservative views about such issues are often incorrect. 
Both liberals and conservatives look for indications of competence and 
benevolence, and judge of these things as best they can. But one side often gets it 
wrong, whereas the other often gets it right. Thus, while both liberals and 
conservatives defer to individuals they take to exhibit signs of competence and 
benevolence, liberals tend to form correct beliefs about “hot” scientific issues, 
whereas conservatives tend to form incorrect views about such issues. 
You might ask: why care if liberal and conservative views about political and “hot” 
scientific issues are rational by the lights of internalist conceptions of rationality? 
The short answer is: because such conceptions capture the idea that rationality is 
connected with the notion of blame (Steup, 1999). On an internalist conception of 
rationality, you must, at least in principle, be able to recognise what it is about the 
way in which you formed the belief that makes it irrational. This seems to permit 
blaming you when you form irrational beliefs. After all, you were in a position to 
recognise that your beliefs are irrational. If it turns out that many climate 
skeptics—and about science in general—are rational in the internalist sense, then it 
makes no sense to blame them for having these attitudes. 
You might also ask: what about the externalist sense of rationality? Can we argue 
that there are important partisan asymmetries in this sense? I lack the space to fully 
answer this question here, but I want to make a few preliminary points.  
First, on an externalist conception of rationality, anyone who generally forms false 
beliefs in some domain is not going to have rational beliefs about that domain. 
This is because, for the externalist, what matters is whether one (generally) gets 
things right. So, in virtue of the fact (which we are assuming) that many 
conservatives have a lot of false beliefs about “hot” scientific issues, those beliefs 
are going to be irrational. The crucial question is whether liberals (who we are 
assuming generally have true beliefs) satisfy externalist conditions on rationality. 
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Second, “externalism” isn’t a single view, but a family of views. Whether liberals 
(generally) have rational beliefs is going to depend on the specific conditions we 
put on rationality. It is important to note that, for the externalist, it isn’t enough 
that one generally form true beliefs about some domain. After all, one can form 
true beliefs through pure luck. Different externalists try to capture this point in 
different ways. Here are two ways: 
1. S’s true belief B is rational just in case, were it false, S wouldn’t have B.vi 
2. S’s true belief B is rational just in case, if things had been (a bit, but not too) 
different, S would still have had B.vii 
The idea behind the first proposal is that, if you would have had the belief if it 
were false, then your belief isn’t sufficiently sensitive to what is actually the case. 
As for the second proposal, there are many other ways the world could be that are 
consistent with your belief being true. The idea behind this proposal is that, if you 
wouldn’t have had the belief if things had been one of these ways, then it is a 
happy accident that you nonetheless managed to form a true belief about the 
world. Of course, the crucial question is: how different? In the present case, it 
might look like things would have to be very different for liberals to have different 
beliefs about, say, climate change. The point of the empirical work discussed above 
that it is in an important sense no accident that liberals accept the science on climate 
change: it fits with their political predispositions. 
Can we argue that there are partisan asymmetries in rationality using either of these 
externalist accounts? On the one hand, I doubt we have any empirical evidence 
that could directly decide the issue. On the other, we can perhaps extrapolate from 
the existing work and argue that it is (at best) unclear whether liberal beliefs about 
science satisfy the first externalist condition. If you take someone with liberal 
political dispositions and ask what they would believe if climate change were in fact 
a myth, then it is plausible to say that they would still believe as they do.  
When it comes to the second externalist condition, things are less clear. We can 
also extrapolate from the existing work and argue that, if you took someone with 
liberal dispositions and somehow managed to fundamentally shift their 
dispositions, then their beliefs about climate change would shift accordingly. But 
does this mean they fail to satisfy the second condition, given that we are now 
imagining that the individual in question is very different to how they in fact are?viii 
1.5. Asymmetries in Intellectual Virtue? 
I finish by looking at some recent empirical work by Dan Kahan which suggests 
that there is an intellectual virtue that minimises the impact of IMR. Thus, 
individuals who exhibit this virtue may be at an epistemic advantage when it comes 
to political and “hot” scientific issues. But, as we will also see, it is not clear that 
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this virtue has a partisan dimension. If this is right, then there is an important class 
of epistemic asymmetries that do not neatly line up with a partisan political divide. 
In a recent paper Kahan and collaborators present evidence that individuals who 
score highly in science curiosity are less prone to IMR. They define science curiosity as 
“a general disposition, variable in intensity across persons, that reflects the 
motivation to seek out and consume scientific information for personal pleasure” 
(Kahan et al., 2017a, p. 180). They found that subjects who scored highly on 
science curiosity had more accurate risk perceptions (e.g. about global warming), 
regardless of their political ideology. They also found evidence that this is because 
subjects who scored highly on science curiosity were more willing to expose 
themselves to information running contrary to their political views and values. 
Thus, science curiosity appears to be a trait that de-activates one of the central 
biases that drives IMR: a preference for attitude-congruent over attitude-
incongruent information (Taber and Lodge, 2006). They therefore hypothesise that 
the scientifically curious: “have a reason to engage information for truth seeking 
that those who are low in science curiosity don’t have: to experience the pleasure 
of contemplating surprising insights into how the world works” (2017a, p. 195).  
While this is just one study, it is worth reflecting on its ramifications. First, it 
suggests there may be asymmetries in tendencies to rely on IMR between groups 
that can’t be characterised in simple political terms. There may be an important 
class of epistemic asymmetries that don’t have a clear political dimension. While 
this isn’t the epistemic asymmetry thesis, it is clearly in the same ballpark.  
The second reason is that it allows us to draw some connections between the 
empirical literature on political cognition and the burgeoning field of virtue 
epistemology.ix This field can be split into two camps. The first camp focuses on what 
are called “faculty virtues”, such as perception, intuition and memory (Sosa, 2007). 
The second camp focuses on character traits such as open-mindedness and 
curiosity (Baehr, 2011; Zagzebski, 1996).  The connection that will concern me 
here is between the literature on political cognition and the second camp, which is 
called “responsibilist virtue epistemology” (RVE). 
What connections can we draw between Kahan’s work on science curiosity and 
RVE? First, in the RVE literature curiosity is construed as a character trait that 
involves a disposition to seek out new and worthwhile information (Watson, 2019). 
We can view science curiosity as a species of curiosity so understood. The 
scientifically curious person is characteristically motivated to acquire new and 
worthwhile scientific information. 
Second, within RVE there is a debate about whether the intellectual virtues need to 
be truth-conducive: if you are intellectually virtuous, must you thereby be more likely 
to get things right (Carter and Gordon, 2014; Kwong, 2017)? This issue is surely 
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amenable to empirical investigation: is the intellectually virtuous individual more 
likely to get things right? We can see Kahan et al.’s study as a small part of that 
investigation: they present evidence that (scientifically) curious, open-minded 
individuals are more likely to form accurate views about issues like climate change. 
Third, a central question in the RVE literature is why be intellectually virtuous. 
One striking feature of this literature is that it focuses on the benefits that might 
accrue to the virtuous individual (Baehr, 2011). Kahan et al.’s work might be used 
as a corrective to this individualistic focus. One might think that virtues which 
mitigate against a tendency to engage in IMR and other forms of bias are 
particularly important for the wellbeing of society at large, given that they lead to a 
reduction in polarisation about political “hot” scientific issues, thereby increasing 
the potential of reaching consensus on public policy decisions. We can thus view 
science curiosity (and perhaps curiosity in general) as a civic-intellectual virtue: It has a 
civic aspect insofar as its cultivation is important for the wellbeing of society at 
large. Thus, there is an answer to the question of why be intellectually virtuous at 
the societal level.  
1.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at some arguments against the thesis that there are 
asymmetries in rationality between liberals and conservatives. I have also looked at 
some recent work by Dan Kahan and collaborators which suggests there may be 
some asymmetries in rationality that lack a clear political dimension. My aim has 
been to show that philosophical reflection can reveal potential lacunae in 
arguments against the epistemic asymmetry thesis. First, while it may be the case 
that we all engage in IMR, this is consistent with there being asymmetries in the 
extent to which we rely on IMR. This may have implications for the rationality of 
our beliefs. Second, while there may be a sense of “rational” in which liberal and 
conservative attitudes are equally rational, there are other senses of “rational” on 
which the status of the epistemic asymmetry thesis is a little less clear.x  
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i Because most of the literature has a US-focus, I use these labels in their US 
senses, and assume a US-centric framing of political debate.  
ii Classic papers on motivated reasoning include (Kunda, 1990) and (Lord et al., 
1979). For overviews see (Jost et al., 2013) and (Molden and Higgins, 2012). 
iii This result fits with the general result that more knowledgeable individuals are 
more rather than less prone to engage in motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge, 
2006). 
iv For an attempt to resist this move see (McKenna, 2019). 
v For an accessible discussion of different varieties of climate skepticism see 
(Walker and Leviston, 2019). For a more academic discussion see (Hobson and 
Niemeyer, 2013). 
vi This is modelled on “sensitivity” accounts of knowledge (Nozick, 1981). 
vii This is modelled on “safety” accounts of knowledge (Sosa, 2007), though I’ve 
expressed the basic idea in a rather crude way for the sake of simplicity. 
viii Making progress on this question will require looking into the details of how 
“safety” conditions should be formulated. For relevant literature see (Hirvelä, 
2019; Pritchard, 2012; Williamson, 2009). 
ix For an overview of this field see (Turri et al., 2018). 
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